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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
of the grounds permitted to be raised in a CPLR 3211 motion. 9 Prior
law was inconsistent in permitting an immediate trial of such factual
issues when a CPLR 3211 motion was treated as a motion for summary
judgment, but denying it on an ordinary CPLR 8212 summary judg-
ment motion. Formerly, an immediate trial was available under CPLR
3212(c) only where the extent of the damages was at issue. Its expansion
to post-answer motions based on grounds enumerated in CPLR 3211(a)
brings symmetry to the two sections which was, for no apparent reason,
previously lacking.100
CPLR 3213: Court will not enter default judgment where instrument
is not for money only and plaintiff gives short notice.
By allowing a plaintiff to serve summary judgment motion papers
in lieu of a complaint, the Legislature has provided a convenient pro-
cedure for securing judgments in certain presumptively meritorious
categories of actions.1 1 The procedure is available only in actions
based upon "an instrument for the payment of money only or upon
any judgment ... .,,102 In noticing the motion to be heard, the plain-
tiff must give the defendant at least as much time as would be allowed
for making an appearance in an ordinary action.10 3 The plaintiff may
extend the notice period by as much as ten days04 beyond the required
minimum and may demand that the defendant serve answering papers
upon him during the period of extension. Although courts have per-
mitted deviations from these complicated requirements where the de-
fendant has appeared and consented to the CPLR 3213 procedure,10 5
a recent case indicates that strict compliance will be demanded as a
condition to entry of judgment when the defendant defaults.
09 JuDiciAL CoNanamNc REPoRT 82-83.
100 See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 111, June 8, 1973, at 4,
col. 1.
101 See 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary at 828 (1970); 4 WK&M 3213.01.
102 CPLR 3213.
103 The time within which an appearance must be made is governed by CPLR 320(a)
in the Supreme and County Courts and by section 402 of the UDCA, UCCA, UJCA, and
CCA in the District, City, Justice, and New York City Civil Courts. The period of time
allowed for an appearance generally depends upon the method of service used.
104 In the lower courts there is no ten-day limitation. See section 1004 of the UDCA,
UCCA, UJCA, and CCA. See also 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary at 835 (1970);
4 WKCM 3213.02.
105 See Reilley v. Insurance Co. of North America, 32 App. Div. 2d 918, 302 N.Y.S2d
435 (1st Dep't 1969) (mem.); Flushing Natl Bank v. Brightside Mfg., Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 108,
298 N.YS.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969). The Court of Appeals in Stevenson v.
News Syndicate Co., Inc., 302 N.Y. 81, 96 N.E.2d 187 (1950) held that
[w]here ... all parties to a litigation choose to do so, they may to a large extent
chart their own procedural course through the courts.
Id. at 87, 96 N.E.2d at 190.
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In Kemp v. Hickson,10 an action was commenced in the District
Court, Suffolk County, pursuant to UDCA 1004, the District Court
counterpart of CPLR 3213. The plaintiffs sought recovery on a real
estate bond which provided that "all of the covenants, conditions and
agreements contained in said mortgage are hereby made part of this
instrument."' 07 Process was served pursuant to CPLR 308(4) on Decem-
ber 27, 1972. The motion was originally noticed to be heard on Jan-
uary 10, 1973, but was later adjourned to January 24, 1973. The plain-
tiff demanded that answering papers be served at least five days prior
to the return date. This meant that the notice period was far shorter
than the required minimum. 08 When the defendant failed to serve
answering papers or to appear on the return date, the court dismissed
the action on two grounds. The court first held that the incorporated
provisions in the real estate bond prevented it from qualifying as an
instrument for the payment of money only.10 9 Secondly, the court held
that the short notice was fatal to jurisdiction. The court distinguished
Flushing National Bank v. Brightside Manufacturing, Inc., °0 wherein
the defendant received short notice but appeared. There it was held
that the defendant had waived any objection to the notice by serving
answering papers and arguing the merits. While the court in Flushing
National Bank retained jurisdiction and gave the defendant an ex-
tended time to answer, the Kemp court held that it could not adopt
this procedure when the defendant had not appeared.
The speed and convenience of a motion under CPLR 3213 make
it a welcome innovation of which practitioners should try to take ad-
vantage. Its successful use requires careful attention to time require-
ments in drawing up the motion papers."' Professor David D. Siegel
has recommended that the practitioner make certain that service is by
personal delivery in accordance with CPLR 308(1) to facilitate calcula-
tion of the return date." 2 As Kemp illustrates, defects are not likely
to be overlooked when a defendant has defaulted.
106 73 Misc. 2d 76, 341 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1973).
107 Id. at 77, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
108 See UDCA 1004 and 402(b)(4).
109 The court cited New York Conference Ass'n of 7th Day Adventists v. 915 James
St. Associates, Ltd., 63 Misc. 2d 38, 310 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1970),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 342, 360 (1970), where a similar
instrument was held not to be for the payment of money only.
110 59 Misc. 2d 108, 298 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 313, 334 (1969).
1I See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary at 832-35 (1970).
112 Id. at 836.
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